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WOE UNTO THEM THAT LAY FIELD 
TO FIELD: CLOSER SETTLEMENT IN 
THE EARLY LIBERAL ERA  
Monique van Alphen Fyfe* 
This article undertakes a re-examination of the origins, construction and application of the Land for 
Settlements legislation in the early Liberal era. The Liberal's commitment to closer settlement reveals 
part of the story of highly contested land policy in colonial New Zealand. Land for Settlements 
legislation of the 1890s, aimed at "bursting up" the great estates, was predominantly the product of 
settlers' ideological aspirations and two determined politicians: John Ballance and John McKenzie. 
When measured against the rhetoric used to promote it, however, the policy was not necessarily 
effective: it was complicated by practical realities and a narrow vision of New Zealand as a vigorous 
Arcadian paradise. When contrasted with the treatment of Māori land, yet more of the complexity of 
the land issue and the frailties of the actors facing it are revealed. The article concludes by proposing 
that Liberal policy, while flawed in execution, may have nevertheless contributed something to the 
consolidation of the concept of New Zealand as an agrarian ideal, a concept that remains largely 
intact today.  
I INTRODUCING AN IDEOLOGY 
Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey; where wealth accumulates, and men decay.1 
Liberal land policy has been an evocative and much examined topic for historians of decades past. 
The emergence of Waitangi Tribunal histories has since tended to homogenise Crown land policy 
such that very real shifts in government initiatives risk becoming overlooked. Land policy was, in 
fact, highly contested in colonial New Zealand. This article addresses the actions of a Government 
which is widely credited, deservedly or not, with introducing radical programmes of land reform, 
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particularly the "bursting up" of great estates. To that end, this article re-examines the detail and effect 
of the Liberals' early closer settlement policy to rediscover something of the complexities of the story.  
First, the broad social and political themes of the era and the viewpoints of key political figures 
are outlined, followed by an examination of the legislation they enacted. Closer settlement was part 
of a myriad of legislation related to land that intended to distribute it more densely and equitably. Its 
particular links to land tax and tenure policies are noted. Also noted is its germination in the thinking 
of reforming politicians such as John Ballance and John McKenzie, whose ideologies were heavily 
influenced by their experiences of land issues in Ireland and Scotland respectively.  
Implementation of the policy is then addressed. The much-celebrated example of Cheviot is 
discussed in detail, followed by a general overview in order to measure the success of the policy with 
reference to the rhetoric that accompanied its promulgation. Looking more broadly, the policy is then 
considered against the treatment of the greatest estate. The Liberal approach to Māori land is 
contrasted with that relating to Pākehā land, revealing yet more of the complexity of the land issue 
and the frailties of the actors facing it.  
The article concludes by examining the proposition that Liberal policy, while flawed in execution, 
may have nevertheless contributed something to the consolidation of an idea of New Zealand: that it 
is a fair and free agrarian paradise.  
II FOUNDATIONS FOR REFORM 
A land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness.2 
A The State of the Colony 
The majority of the adult European population in 1890 were migrants. Their idea of New Zealand 
was one shaped by the promotion of the colonies as a "'New World' utopia", where industriousness 
rather than inherited privilege would be rewarded.3 It had long been recognised that settlers were 
"animated by the desire of having a piece of the world they may call their own".4 Steeped in various 
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shades of biblical education, settlers projected a "common desire for greater equality".5 Politicians, 
also so steeped, frequently saw themselves as nation builders as the words of John Ballance illustrate:6  
… we are engaged in building up – or rather laying the foundation – of a great Nation, which certainly is 
now one of the brightest jewels in the British Crown. A self governing country, the people of which are 
earnestly devoted to freedom … 
The divide between the Old and New Worlds is starkly apparent in the land debate. As David 
Hackett Fischer notes:7 
Land had a double importance in setter societies. It was arguably the most important instrument for the 
shaping of a social order. At the same time, it was perceived as the primary way to individual wealth. 
These two purposes were often at odds, increasingly so.  
Fears that Old World class systems were replicating themselves in New Zealand are amply illustrated 
by parliamentary debates.8 Land, the principal source of livelihood and security – and thus freedom – 
was seen as becoming concentrated in the hands of the few. Even more affronting, this land often sat 
idle. Politicians claimed New Zealand, an assumed tabula rasa, had an opportunity to set a different 
path.  By providing solutions to these Old World problems, as a "social laboratory of the world" New 
Zealand had an opportunity to establish its national identity.9 
Land, or access to it, was considered the cause of and answer to many contemporary problems. It 
was of particular concern in the South Island, especially Canterbury and Otago, where vast estates 
were common and there was little surplus Crown land and virtually no Māori land left into which to 
expand. Without it, southern farmers feared their sons would be forced to migrate to the North Island 
or Australia.10 Settlers in the North Island, too, complained of a lack of land, but the monopolisers 
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were Māori.11 Across the country, lack of land was seen as contributing to unemployment and 
population pressure in towns.12 Urbanisation was viewed as inferior to and less productive than rural 
living.13 Policy to reverse this trend was generally welcomed. Land reform was thus considered by 
many Liberals to be the foremost of all political questions, of universal significance and the universal 
solution.14  
The land question manifested itself in growing hostility towards land banking, landlordism and 
owner absenteeism. Settlers wanted to own land to achieve independence and raise their prospects, 
but also, as Miles Fairburn suggests, to connect with the land in a way perceived as interrupted by the 
industrial revolution.15 Given that in 1888 one per cent of landowners owned 64 per cent of available 
freehold land,16 this was an impossible dream. If the 1880s had been the decade of runholders and 
monopoly, the following decade promised to be very different. 
New Zealand in 1890 was in the throes of recovering from prolonged economic depression. Large 
landowners had generally escaped unscathed, but smaller farmers struggled immensely. The 
increasing monopoly in land ownership combined with a reluctance to sell at depressed prices was 
locking smaller farmers out.17 Compounding this were the unsavoury tactics of grid-ironing (buying 
up attractive pockets and leaving others inaccessible or unprofitable) and dummyism (buying land in 
the name of another to circumvent statutory limits). These circumstances began to shape questions: 
what amount of land was enough, who ought to own it, and under what terms? Tom Brooking 
summarises it thus: "The land debate was … about the hard issues of paying off debt, productivity, 
monopoly of wealth, and political power, as well as softer and more sentimental issues."18 
The debate raging behind this was one of tenure: which of freehold or leasehold ought to be 
dominant in this New World? Passion ignited either side. Hardline leaseholders, who tended to be 
urbanites, argued such tenure would enable more settlers to obtain land at fairer prices. Long fixed 
leases also offered more security than freehold because the latter was subject to reclamation at any 
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time by the Crown or, indeed, mortgagees. Furthermore, if such land was leased from a benevolent 
landlord – which only the State could be – the ensuing fair rental would free up capital for 
improvements.19 Freeholders, on the other hand, generally argued for choice of tenure. The few 
hardliners, who tended to be large landholders, viewed leasehold with suspicion. They not only feared 
rent increases by stealth, but also argued settlers had emigrated in order to gain freehold, not 
leasehold.20 Land tenure policy was thus integrally linked to closer settlement. 
Besides Māori land tenures, up to 1891 New Zealand enjoyed several principal types of tenure: 
freehold, agricultural leases,21 deferred payment licences,22 30-year perpetual leases with rights of 
purchase introduced by William Rolleston in 1882,23 small grazing runs established by John Ballance 
in 1885 for small sheep farmers,24 and special and village settlements.25 Various experiments with 
these latter tenures had been attempted with little success.26  
Throughout the Liberal era other tenures were added. Firstly, cash purchases were discouraged by 
limiting the available acreage and preventing title being issued until improvement requirements were 
met.27 Leases in perpetuity, a peculiar political compromise, replaced perpetual leases and ran for 999 
years without rent reappraisals, but were also subject to strict improvement requirements.28 
Occupation with right of purchase provided a 25-year lease, with purchase rights available after 10 
years, also subject to improvements.29 In 1907, renewable leases finally replaced leases in 
perpetuity.30 The complexity of these options is palpable. Proprietors of large estates often held land 
under a mixture of freehold and leasehold. Within that seemingly simple distinction, types of tenure 
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were something of a motley assembly that reflected their origins in political compromise due to 
disunity on the issue, even within the Liberal faction.  
These later tenure options were largely thanks to the matrix of land legislation introduced from 
1892 as a means to effect closer settlement of the land. Instead of clarifying or consolidating tenure, 
closer settlement contributed to its complexity.  
Closer settlement policy was, in essence, to encourage the breaking up of large areas of sparsely 
populated land into smaller estates supporting a denser farming population. It was believed that this 
would simultaneously solve landlessness, unemployment and urban overpopulation. It was broadly 
supported by settlers throughout the colony, including many conservatives and large landholders.31 
Communal operation of land, such as that practiced by Māori, was not favoured. "[P]rogress and 
civilisation" was associated not with uninhabited bush but with "well-tilled fields".32  
Associated with this was a question of who ought to benefit from increases in land value due to 
public works. Recent railway extensions had significantly increased the value of some estates, and 
unsuccessful legislative attempts were made to recover this "unearned increment" for the State.33 The 
work of Henry George was considered by some Liberals as a better solution. George proposed a single 
tax on unimproved land which would force development or divestment of unproductive land.34 Land 
divested to the State could be rented on periodic review. Taxation and rent would thus return to the 
State increases in land value for which it was mostly responsible.  
Within this context, politicians attempted to position themselves for the 1890 general election, 
fought predominantly on the issue of land reform.  
B The Positions of Ballance and McKenzie 
The 1890 general election might be called a watershed moment for New Zealand political history. 
Whereas 1887 is noted for what Keith Sinclair suggests was the emergence of nationwide political 
groups that might become parties,35 1890 saw control of the Executive relocate to a group of men 
who, in one arrangement or another, would hold the balance of power for almost 22 years. Of these 
men, two in particular were of paramount importance in relation to the production of early Liberal 
land policy: John Ballance and John "Jock" McKenzie. 
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Ballance, Premier from 1891 until his death in early 1893, had emigrated from Ireland via 
Birmingham, finally settling in Whanganui in 1866. The son of a tenant farmer, Ballance himself had 
little interest in working the land and instead became the proprietor of several successful 
newspapers.36 Upon becoming Premier, he was one of the few North Islanders holding any of the 
powerful Cabinet positions. He had form for radical land policy. As Minister of Lands from 1884 to 
1887, he saw land settlement as a part of the solution to devastating unemployment and undesirable 
urban drift.37 In introducing the Bill that would become the Land Act 1885 he noted:38 
… the best of all kinds of bonafide settlement is that which enables the State to retain control over the 
land, and which enable the people who want land to cultivate and not for speculative purposes to go onto 
the land and hold it.  
For the purpose of settlement, there was, he said, "nothing in the world which will compare with the 
system of perpetual leasing".39 The Land Act established new forms of settlement including 
smallholdings (for part-time labourers near cities), special settlements, land grazing and village 
homestead special settlements.40 In promoting a wide range of settlement options, Ballance was 
interested in achieving equitable interdependence between town and country.  
After returning to the opposition bench in 1887, he reprinted earlier articles on land reform in 
which he predicted the "'freehold sentiment' will die away in the presence of hard logic and facts",41 
to the benefit of the "cultivator of the soil, rather than the speculator".42 Ballance was well-read, citing 
the likes of JS Mill and Henry George in his articles and speeches. These two in particular provided 
the intellectual foundation he desired in support of his idea that the problems colonial New Zealand 
faced lay in the land. Combining the ideas of Mill and George, his was ostensibly a "complete theory 
of prosperity and stability".43  
Recovering the unearned increment was a method to discourage landlordism and absenteeism by 
depressing capital gains. He took care to emphasise that smallholdings would not be affected; rather 
his targets were large estates, particularly those of absentee or idle owners. His desire was to limit 
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landholding to 2,000 acres, which (betraying his northern perspective) might have worked for North 
Island beef or dairy farms, but not for southern sheep runs.44 The justification of the tax was twofold: 
the moral right to take that which an owner has not earned, and fairness in expecting those who enjoy 
more privileges to contribute accordingly.45 
His aim for land nationalisation was a separate goal, with slightly different justifications:46 
… the principal reason in favour of the nationalization of the land is that the land of any country soon 
becomes a monopoly, the possessors being few in comparison with the population. The monopolists 
without effort grow rich. The landless, continually increasing their number, grow poor … Let us suppose, 
now, that we have only national land. The phenomena presented in this case would be, on the one hand a 
body of cultivators paying rent, to the State; and on the other a greater body living by wages, mainly in 
towns, deriving a beneficial interest from the rents, and remaining content in the knowledge that they 
participate in the prosperity of the agricultural tenant.  
Wealth, he argued, stems from the land and also benefits urban dwellers. Only the equitable 
distribution of land via nationalisation would meet the demands of the settler population and guarantee 
a measure of equality, security and political stability.47 He went so far as to claim the previous 
economic depression was a result of land monopoly and poor administration of underutilised 
government land.48 Moreover, land nationalisation promoted democratic principles: it benefitted the 
many rather than the few and encouraged more individualistic use of the land.49  
Ballance was both more and less radical than his intellectual sources. He never sought to 
implement a flat single tax, but instead combined a graduated tax with nationalisation to create a 
tempered solution in response to the mood of the electorate. His programme was revived, albeit 
somewhat revised, by McKenzie in 1891. 
McKenzie was the Minister of Lands from 1891 to 1900. Born in the parish of Rosskeen in Ross 
and Cromarty, Scotland, in 1839, he immigrated to New Zealand in 1860 and become a moderately 
successful farmer near Palmerston. His character was coloured by a deep sense of moral 
responsibility, illustrated by his acknowledging (and thus legitimising in Scottish custom) a child born 
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to him out of wedlock during his teenage years.50 Like Ballance, his strong moral position was heavily 
influenced by experiences of substantial inequality in his home country. 
The Scottish Highland Clearances were a traumatic period of tenural upheaval, forced eviction 
and cultural dislocation that lasted for over 100 years.51 A five-year-old McKenzie witnessed 
disturbing scenes of the effects of one of the Clearances' most acrimonious episodes. Ninety people, 
including many children, had taken shelter in rudimentary tents set up in a graveyard; they had 
nowhere to go but the place used as refuge by only the most desperate of criminals.52 He had seen, he 
claimed, the ground tilled to hide the blood of those who attempted to protect their homes.53 Although 
his own family never suffered eviction, he later married Ann Munro whose family had.54 The 
experience, reinforced by the culture of the Free Church to which he belonged, cemented a belief in 
the dangers of extravagant landlordism that he would carry with him while shaping land policy in the 
New World.  
His expertise and passion was in land, and he knew it. Entering Parliament in 1881 he shrewdly 
delayed his maiden speech until 1882 to respond to Rolleston's Land Bill, a tactic that earned him the 
status of a backbencher to watch.55 His later speech in closing debate on his own Land Bill referred 
in emotional terms to his Scottish encounter:56  
The Minister of Lands, Sir, got his ideas as a boy when he saw the poor people evicted from their houses 
in the most cruel manner, and unable to get a place for their feet to stand upon … they went to the 
cemeteries. The poor people were not even allowed to camp upon the King's highway. The only place in 
the world where they could go and rest themselves without being put in gaol was among the dead in the 
cemetery. I have seen that in my days. Is it any wonder that I should have opinions of my own in 
connection with the land question in this country?  
  
50  Brooking, above n 10, at 25–26.  
51  See for example Alexander Mackenzie The history of the Highland clearances (2nd ed, Stirling, Eneas 
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52  Brooking, above n 10, at 15–16. 
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55  (14 July 1882) 42 NZPD 341–343. See also Brooking, above n 10, at 59.  
56  (10 August 1892) 76 NZPD 603.  
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Whatever later revisionists might have to say about the true causes and justifications for the 
clearances, Brooking concludes McKenzie's views were drawn primarily on moral rather than 
economic considerations, and these underlined his justifications for legislative reform.57 
He led two Committees of Inquiry into land in 1885 and 1890. Neither had significant impact on 
the practice of grid-ironing or dummyism, but they did enhance McKenzie's focus on the great estates 
and raise his profile such that he became something of an "emerging 'land specialist'".58 He employed 
accusations of political corruption and favouritism to consolidate his foundation as a battler for the 
little people.59  
Not obviously driven by intellectual theories, McKenzie instead built principles based on his own 
personal and industry experiences. In Rosskeen, successful farmers operated on larger blocks; smaller 
ones advocated for by urban radicals tended to lock farmers into poverty and dependency. McKenzie's 
experience of New Zealand reinforced this: his own fortunes turned largely upon the acquisition of 
larger land holdings.60 He brought to Liberal policy a practicality alongside his lifelong passionate 
desire to make the Scottish experience an impossibility in the New World.  
The combination of the intellectual theories and pragmatism of Ballance and the relentless 
determination and farming experience of McKenzie are perhaps the reason Liberal closer settlement 
policy is best characterised not as radical or pure, but as a mingling of ideology and practicality.  
III CONSTRUCTING AN IDEOLOGY 
Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no place, that they may be 
placed alone in the midst of the earth.61 
A The Legislative Framework 
Closer settlement was not the product of a single piece of legislation. Although the policy is 
primarily associated with the various Land for Settlements Acts and their amendments, one of the 
policy's most illustrious demonstrations was the result of entirely different legislation: the Land and 
Income Assessment Act 1891. Further, the revised Land Act of 1892 set the parameters for the types 
of tenure available for the disposal of Crown land. Ultimately, the policy was given definitive 
  
57  Brooking, above n 10, at 18. 
58  At 61–63.  
59  At 63–64.  
60  At 33–38.  
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manifestation in the Land for Settlements Acts, which granted significant executive powers to obtain 
and exploit land for closer settlement.  
1 The Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 
The Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 (LIAA) was Ballance's tool to implement his 
graduated version of a Georgian land tax. Ballance sought to tweak the market to incentivise smaller 
landholdings and thus increase equality of ownership. The 1881 Property Assessment Act that the 
LIAA replaced contained provisions to compel the Government to buy and dispose of land subject to 
disputed tax valuations; but these were fiscal, not social in their purpose.62 These provisions were 
continued in the LIAA for the "protection of the revenue", again fiscally focused over any social 
aim.63  
Because the LIAA instigated a graduated land tax on unimproved land, owners were incentivised 
to place value on improvements to minimise tax obligations and government valuers the opposite to 
maximise tax intake. This, combined with s 31 of the LIAA that allowed owners to initiate the buyback 
provisions, foreshadowed that large runholders might undercook their valuations to take advantage of 
a government buyer in a stagnant market. No one, not even Ballance, envisaged this;64 the anticipated 
beneficiaries of s 31 were owners of smallholdings unable to meet tax obligations.  
Some larger landowners were worried. The graduated tax would have a significant impact on the 
income of large mortgaged properties, rendering some arrangements financially unsound.65 
Nevertheless, it was less financial strife and more a family disagreement that brought about the most 
conspicuous use of these provisions: the Cheviot estate purchase discussed below.  
A landholder's ability to initiate buyback was not addressed until the Act and its amendments were 
consolidated in 1900, which removed the buyback provisions entirely.66 This suggests that even 
though it was in a sense used against them, the Government was not overly concerned about such 
exposure. 
  
62  Property Assessment Amendment Act 1881, ss 13 and 14. 
63  Land and Income Assessment Act 1891, ss 30 and 31. 
64  WJ Gardner A Pastoral Kingdom Divided Cheviot, 1889–1894 (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1992) 
at 98. 
65  G Stead "The Chamber of Commerce: The Taxation Proposal" The Press (Christchurch, 30 July 1891) at 6.  
66  Land and Income Assessment Act 1900. 
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2 The Land Act 1892 
The Liberals introduced a Land Bill in 1891, but were not successful in passing anything like it 
into law until the following year.67 The 1891 Bill proposed to repeal the 1890 Land Act and dealt 
comprehensively with numerous aspects of land in the colony. McKenzie's introduction embodied the 
idea that New Zealand had opportunities to be better than Britain; the legislation was "a step in the 
right direction", "an advance as far as public opinion will allow us to go" and would:68 
… assist us in drawing out … the people from the great cities of the world, and out of the dark dens and 
the dark receptacles of those cities, and will send them to the valleys and straths of the uplands where their 
happy voices will sound with gladness and energy, and it will give each his full share of earth and sky. 
The Bill sought to consolidate the "one man one run" principle,69 going so far as to impose 
imprisonment on those evading its provisions in order to emphasise that tactics such as dummyism 
were no better than theft.70 It also allowed the Government to acquire land and dispose of it via two 
new types of tenure: perpetual lease with periodic rent reappraisals (what came to be called leases in 
perpetuity);71 and deferred payment (a 25-year licence that came to be called "lands for 
occupation").72 These were in addition to the existing tenures of freehold, small grazing runs, village 
settlements, and special settlements that the Land Bill carried over.73 The Bill was passed by the 
House of Representatives, but failed to gain the support of an aggressive Legislative Council despite 
conferences between the two.74  
A second attempt, what became the Land Act of 1892, retained much of the 1891 Bill, but passed 
the Legislative Council only after protracted negotiations.75 Key concerns were the rent reappraisals 
associated with leases in perpetuity and a lack of purchasing options associated with lands for 
occupation. Section 157 of the enacted legislation made no reference to rent reappraisals and s 152(3) 
inserted an option to either purchase the freehold or exchange the licence for a lease in perpetuity after 
  
67  There were multiple versions of the Bill: Land Bill 1891 (75-1); Land Bill 1891 (75-2); Land Bill 1891 (75-
3); and Land Bill 1891 (75-4).  
68  (21 July 1891) 72 NZPD 369–379. See also Brooking, above n 10, at 103–104. 
69  Brooking, above n 10, at 102. 
70  See for example Land Bill 1891 (75-1), cls 84, 85, 138, 146, 154 and 185. 
71  Clause 143. Compare Land Act 1892, s 157.  
72  Clause 136. Compare Land Act 1892, s 152.  
73  Clause 126, and pts IV and V.  
74  (22 September 1891) 74 NZPD 812, 850 and 872. See also Brooking, above n 10, at 105–106. 
75  (6 October 1892) 78 NZPD 717. See also Brooking, above n 10, at 113. 
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10 years of occupation.76 These changes meant the State could not preserve for itself the unearned 
increment, nor maintain ownership of the land. Respectively, these two factors greatly diminished the 
potential of the Act to serve as a tool to establish a Georgian land tax system and found leasehold as 
the emerging dominant land tenure. Already ideology was morphing at the hands of political reality.  
3 The Land for Settlements Act 1892 
The inaugural Land for Settlements Bill of 1891 sought to introduce a more direct mechanism 
than the LIAA for breaking up large estates.77 It incorporated both voluntary and compulsory takings 
of land deemed necessary for achieving closer settlement in areas where land was in short supply. For 
the purpose of "providing land for settlement", cl 4 allowed the Governor to "contract with any owner 
of private land" to purchase that property, and provided the Governor with the power to "take any 
land" under the Public Works Act 1882.78 Compulsory taking was not without limits; for example, 
the site of a dwelling house (up to 2,000 acres) was not to be taken, nor was any land already precluded 
by the Public Works Act available for compulsory purchase.79 Any land successfully acquired could 
be disposed of only via perpetual lease (later leases in perpetuity), with no option to purchase the 
freehold.80 Allotments could not exceed 320 acres.81 It was a bold move that looked a lot like 
involuntary land nationalisation; it called for bold justifications.  
On its second reading, McKenzie focused on the right of the State to take land, the necessity of 
such measures and the propriety of the measures proposed:82  
… if large estates stand in the way of the settlement and progress of the country, we can claim the right to 
resume such properties on such terms as will do no injustice to the people from whom we take them. 
Citing the country districts of Canterbury, Timaru and Oamaru, McKenzie noted the potential for 
migration should the Bill not be passed.83 Wary of the need to obtain the support of town-based 
Members of the House of Representatives, he sought to emphasise cities' reliance on the country for 
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commerce and supplies to support their population.84 Mention was made of the need to capitalise on 
recent railway installation, which was, he claimed, wasted where it ran only through great estates. 
Refuting claims that the Bill was revolutionary, McKenzie asserted that concerns regarding 
compulsion and potential "jobbery" would be mitigated by the State restricting itself to obtaining the 
most appropriate land and only for the purpose of settlement.85 Finally, in addressing whether the 
land so obtained ought to be leased or sold outright, McKenzie pointed to the potential for any land 
sold outright to fall back into the great estates, thus confounding the very purpose of the Bill.86  
Debate centred not so much on the more fundamental question of the State's right to take land, but 
on whether the time was ripe for such measures and a fear that the Minister would be inundated with 
offers of substandard land. Some support from the opposition – several of whom were large 
landowners87 – was grudgingly forthcoming, due to electorate demand and perhaps, in part, to 
Rolleston's previous attempts at similar if less radical measures.88  
McKenzie spent much of his closing comments on his surprise at the adverse stance of Māori 
Members, who feared greater loss of Māori land,89 and chastising his colleagues generally for being 
"prepared to give to private individuals what they are not prepared to give to the Government".90 The 
Bill passed its third reading in the House of Representatives without trouble.91 It failed at the 
Legislative Council.92  
Like the Land Bill, take two of the Land for Settlement legislation took place the following year.93 
Despite the limitations on compulsory purchase in the earlier Bill, the contention it caused proved too 
onerous. Political necessity meant the revised Bill, and the Act, excluded the compulsory purchase 
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provisions altogether and removed any reference to the Public Works Act 1882.94 However, the tenure 
for disposal remained solely leases in perpetuity,95 and maximum holdings of Land for Settlements 
land stayed at 320 acres.96  
Despite removing the most contentious issue, debate was similarly divided and, surprisingly, more 
strident. Concerns were raised regarding, inter alia, financial matters, repudiation by settlers, 
discrepancies in rental proposals between various Acts and removing parliamentary oversight.97 
These concerns, however strident, were clearly outweighed by support. One Member of the House 
foreshadowed the Cheviot affair, commenting favourably that such a division of the estate would 
"increase the prosperity of the whole district".98 Another referenced a similar Bill which was soon to 
be introduced in the English House of Commons, from which a desire to lead rather than follow might 
be inferred.99 The Land for Settlements Act 1892 (LFSA) became law by a comfortable margin in 
both the House of Representatives and the Legislative Council.100  
These legislative measures acted in concert, providing a complex scheme to effect closer 
settlement of rural land. Before the scheme coalesced, however, the Liberals were presented with a 
providential but risky opportunity to test-run their policy. The risk they took came to symbolise 
Liberal aspirations for their platform of reform.  
IV AN IDEOLOGY IN ACTION 
That the hands shall henceforth have acres, and the acres shall henceforth have hands!101 
A The Great Estates 
The LFSA promised land for the landless and envisaged many more settlers on many more plots 
of land: an agrarian paradise of self-sufficient smallholdings. While David Hamer is sceptical of 
claims of Liberal idealism in general,102 with respect to land they were not merely cynical pragmatists, 
but also idealists. However, and with the possible exception of Ballance, they were not radicals. 
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Examination of the legislation instead indicates a careful if complicated restructuring of the land and 
economic system in tandem, with lofty goals alongside practical solutions. Its application, too, 
deserves close scrutiny.  
The LFSA was not yet in effect when the first and most notable expression of its policy began to 
unfold. Cheviot, regarded as the exemplar of closer settlement policy, was not a consequence of the 
LFSA, but rather something of an unexpected prize in a lottery accidentally orchestrated by the LIAA 
buyback provisions.103 
William "Ready Money" Robinson died in 1889, leaving Cheviot – his 84,000-acre Canterbury 
estate – on trust to five daughters. His heirs had various aspirations for Cheviot, one in particular 
vying for the property's sale. There were, however, few private buyers for an estate of such a scale, 
and the trustees advised against developing and dividing it privately.104 Under pressure from the heirs, 
mortgagees and the looming LIAA taxes, one of Cheviot's trustees, Francis Henry Dillon Bell, appears 
to have developed a strategy of forcing the Government's hand to buy the property using s 31.105 The 
trustees disputed the estate's government valuation using s 19, initiating the LIAA review process.106 
Given the official position on large estates and the LIAA purpose of revenue protection, it was never 
likely that the trustees would receive a favourable outcome, thus providing them with an "impeccable" 
claim to invoke s 31.107  
The Cabinet decision to acquire Cheviot was made between the parliamentary sessions of 1892 
and 1893. The price agreed was £260,220. Such administrative action itself was not unheard of, but a 
"proposal of this magnitude, in such a crucial field and involving a very large sum, was without 
precedent".108 Tidying up the purpose of acquisition and payment for the estate, however, required 
parliamentary action.109 Rolleston, during one of these debates, foretold that Cheviot would become 
a "white elephant".110 It did not.  
Ballance was initially reluctant to agree to the purchase, and the few surviving documents suggest 
the deal was instead championed in Cabinet by McKenzie.111 Ballance's later declarations indicate 
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public enthusiasm may have changed his mind.112 Due to both illness and McKenzie's growing 
dominance, Ballance's influence on the Cheviot affair was slight. By the time Parliament reconvened 
to consider the matters of Cheviot's payment and divestment, Ballance had passed away. Despite this, 
it was his land tax legislation aimed at reducing the sizes of estates that provided McKenzie with a 
rather remarkable opportunity to illustrate the potential of a more extensive policy to do just that.  
During 1893, Cheviot was surveyed and divided into three types of tenures under the Land Act 
1892: payment for cash, grazing run leases and leases in perpetuity. Three ballots were held to allocate 
the land from November 1893 to May 1894. Almost all the land was disposed of, a significant 
proportion of which was to be held on leases in perpetuity. Ballance's village settlement plots made 
an appearance, but were a resounding failure due to their undesirability as security for capital and a 
lack of employment in the area – Liberal policy did not provide similar levels of support to diversity 
in employment as it did to land tenure.113 The plots that remained viable long-term were the small 
farms under McKenzie's lease in perpetuity.114 The relative success between the two settlement types 
illustrates a weakness of both McKenzie in particular and the Liberals in general: an unending focus 
on the farm as the primary unit of closer settlement, at the expense of adequately supporting other 
lifestyles within the colony. 
Richard Seddon, Ballance's unintended successor as Premier,115 promoted the Cheviot settlement 
promise with enthusiasm in Christchurch during the 1893 election campaign.116 The Liberals won 
every seat in the Canterbury district, the first and last time they did so. All those elected except 
William Pember Reeves were farmers. Cheviot had resulted in a substantial electoral victory that 
galvanised support across the country for agrarian rather than urban solutions.117 This in turn 
cemented the promise of "Cheviots to come" as a foundational Liberal policy;118 that promise relied 
primarily upon the continued efforts of McKenzie, but also upon the careful management of 
Seddon.119 Beyond the election, Cheviot was frequently used as a political catch cry. McKenzie 
leveraged its success to pass the 1894 LFSA introducing compulsion, increasing funding and further 
reducing parliamentary oversight.  
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The Land for Settlements Bill 1893 was McKenzie's first attempt to reintroduce compulsory 
purchase. Again this passed the House, but not the Council.120 In 1894, after the "unprecedented" 
election result and lingering threats to stack the Legislative Council, he was more successful.121 Just 
one Councillor, the perennially anti-McKenzie Robert Pharazyn, spoke against the Bill, throwing 
every intellectual and biblical argument he could at the policy – including the 10th commandment.122 
His energetic complaints were to little effect. The Liberals managed to get their compulsory purchase 
provisions passed into law.123 No other jurisdiction in Australasia had such measures for anything 
other than military emergencies.124 It was, without exaggeration, remarkably unique.  
In contrast to compulsory purchase, some amendments favoured original proprietors. Fair 
compensation had always been a feature, but not one that was overly emphasised in promoting the 
policy. Even before the advent of the 1894 legislation, however, Seddon began to downplay the drastic 
bursting up rhetoric, preferring to stress fair compensation for landowners.125 Provisions enabled 
owners to, for instance, require the Crown to purchase the entire estate,126 retain large areas of land 
of their choosing,127 and stay in possession for nine months (extended to 12 in 1900) following the 
proclamation of taking.128 An amendment Act in 1895 gave original proprietors the right to obtain 
leases in perpetuity of their homestead and surroundings.129 In 1897, a new provision required the 
Minister to notify and compensate not only registered proprietors, but also anyone else known to have 
an interest in the estate.130 1899 saw more provisions protecting owners' interests, this time factoring 
loss of business into compensation calculations,131 which in essence gave legislative effect to an 
earlier judgment of the Compensation Court.132 Those who had worked on the land and risked loss of 
employment through land acquisition could also obtain preferential blocks, as was done amid 
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controversy and legal action at Otekaike in 1908.133 Generosity to owners and others with an interest 
in the land expanded considerably in the years following the inaugural LFSA. What might appear to 
have been radical policy at the expense of owners of large estates had features that were instead 
decidedly equitable to them, a proposition supported by a great many owners so affected.134 
It is arguable that closer settlement policy actually benefitted the wealthy by giving them a 
guaranteed and reliable buyer in uncertain economic times. Despite being subject to more sustained 
use of the compulsory provisions, land-owning companies that had reluctantly acquired land from 
foreclosures saw the LFSA as an opportunity to rid themselves of such unwanted assets.135 However, 
it is not clear the times were as strident as sometimes made out: few acquisitions via the LFSA were 
the result of bankruptcy and much of the land obtained was unburdened by heavy mortgages.136 In 
addition, there is ample evidence of large estate holders holding out for many years in order to receive 
higher government offers,137 and matching the Government in the amount of private subdivision.138 
In any event, the LFSA was not generally viewed by the holders of large estates as wholly 
objectionable.  
The policy's main purpose, however, was not forgotten. Recognising the need to back settlers with 
capital, an 1896 amendment expanded on other legislation in allowing advances to settlers on 
generous terms.139 The focus on ensuring settlement success is evident, too, in the requirement that 
applicants demonstrate means for meeting improvement conditions imposed in order to combat 
absenteeism. At the 1904 subdivision at Matamata, for instance, 85 per cent had means over £50,140 
indicating it was settled by "farmers of moderate means and not by struggling land-hungry rural 
workers".141 As an exercise in fairness and equality, the 1908 subdivision of Otekaike is similarly 
lacking. Although technically landless, all applicants had access to capital ranging from £42 
(somewhat of an outlier) to a considerable £3,200. In addition, some 23 per cent of the successful 
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applicants were businessmen, rather than labourers or farmers.142 Bob Hall summarises the settlement 
thus:143  
The intention of the settlement was to break a local instance of landed monopoly and provide land for the 
landless. This much was successfully achieved, but it has to be borne in mind that the "landless" settlers 
in question were people with access to some capital, who nevertheless, for the most part did not retain 
their properties for very long. 
The desire to ensure each settler's success resulted in improvement conditions associated with 
their tenure. To ensure these were met, the LFSA required settlers to demonstrate a minimum access 
to capital, which effectively excluded a large number of labouring settlers. These conditions 
necessarily conflict with the rhetoric used to sell the policy to the electorate. The phrase "land for the 
landless" captured a purity not entirely borne out in practice.  
Another feature that illustrates a disconnect between rhetoric and reality is the size of estates 
bursted up. The Liberals succeeded in bursting up some 223 estates and resettling approximately 1.3 
million acres of land.144 Studies show the proportion of wealth held by the top one per cent of estates 
fell from 65 per cent in 1893 to 30 per cent by 1912.145 The great estates reduced in number and in 
size, and the average size of landholdings fell overall. Yet the estates acquired by the Liberals under 
the LFSA were not predominantly "great". Eighty-three per cent were under 10,000 acres, and almost 
half were under 1,000.146 Barely 13 were above 20,000 acres.147 While there were far fewer wealthy 
families, the policy "never attempted to tear down the top, or to destroy the old élite".148 It is difficult, 
by any measure, to describe this as bursting up the great estates. Perhaps a better characterisation 
would be a gradual and careful reallocation of the middling estates, but this itself requires the 
assumption that closer settlement caused rather than complemented broader social change.  
The debate between freehold and leasehold never fell away. McKenzie was not endeared to those 
who continued to object to leases in perpetuity; such complaints, he said, were "largely from men who 
have taken land under leasehold, been successful, and now want the freehold".149 After McKenzie's 
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death in 1901, the complaints began to get louder. Seddon, loyal to McKenzie to the end, retorted that 
freehold advocates wished to "kick away the ladder" that had enabled their own success.150 Settlers 
from Matamata who spoke to the 1905 Royal Commission on Land agitated for freehold over 
leasehold at a ratio of 23 to one.151 Most, particularly those who did not hold sheep runs where 
freehold would confer little financial gain, wanted to cash-in on rising land values.152 Ballance's views 
of the benefits of nationalising the unearned increment were no longer favoured by the public, if 
indeed they ever were.  
This agitation became louder still after the death of Seddon in 1906. As Hamer observed, due to 
its origins as a political compromise, the lease in perpetuity found few defenders.153 Joseph Ward, 
seeking to cement his premiership on the back of Seddon's success, sought to end the debate and, in 
1907, leases in perpetuity were dropped altogether in favour of renewable leases with a right of 
purchase.154  
Throughout, the Liberals did not ignore the need to address specifically urban issues, although 
their belief in the superiority of rural living meant for some time they effectively limited themselves 
to tweaking a policy designed by a farmer for rural land. They sought to increase the number of 
settlements that might benefit urban workers by allowing smaller areas to be taken near Auckland, 
Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin,155 and later permitting purchase of smaller lots beyond those 
four centres.156 Such measures were woefully inadequate and formed one of several factors that led 
to the Liberal's decline, married with the growing dominance of Auckland where the Liberals had 
struggled to gain support.157 The LFSA might be seen as a success for farmers. Yet it did little to 
alleviate the real and pressing problems in urban centres, whose population generally, much to the 
Liberals' consternation, showed little interest in actively partaking in the Arcadian dream.158 The 
focus on farming as the panacea to New Zealand's ills might be characterised as a policy designed to 
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solve Old World problems while neglecting a thorough assessment of the New World's peculiar 
context. This is true too, of Liberal considerations of Māori land.  
B The Greatest Estate 
A discussion of Liberal settlement policy cannot fail to mention treatment of the Māori estate. 
Despite reinstating pre-emption ostensibly to protect Māori from unscrupulous purchasers,159 the 
early Liberal era, in contrast to the latter half of the administration, was exceptionally active in 
appropriating Māori land. The Maori Land Purchase Office under McKenzie was responsible for 
buying more Māori land at a cheaper price than any other single administration in New Zealand 
history.160 JS Duncan provides a concise comparison:161 
The Liberal's attack on large freehold estates was one solution to their problem of finding land for their 
land-hungry supporter; it was largely doctrinaire. The other solution they found was unashamedly 
expedient: to buy land from the Maoris as quickly and cheaply as possible. The government spent nearly 
five million pounds between 1893 and 1906 on the purchase of one million acres of freehold land. Over 
the same period, it spent about £650,000 on the purchase of some three million acres of Maori land in the 
North Island.  
The disparity in price might, as Duncan suggests, go some way to explain the fact that while the 
land acquired under the LFSA represented less than one-fifth of the land held in blocks of more than 
10,000 acres at the beginning of the Liberal era, in contrast, the amount taken from Māori was several 
orders of magnitude more in total acreage and represented one-third of the land Māori held at 1891.162  
This was not merely a matter of the circumstance that more land belonged to Māori in areas where 
population pressure was growing. It was a matter of carefully engineered policy. Funding for buying 
Māori land far exceeded that under the LFSA.163 Land retention provisions for owners whose land 
was subject to acquisition under Māori land legislation allowed only a fraction of what owners could 
retain under the LFSA and, in addition, Māori could not retain their homesteads.164 The presumption 
that Māori could apply for land under the LFSA was an absurdity: many held land in communal 
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ownership, which prevented them from falling within the category of landless and thus "bona fide 
settlers".165  
The Liberal philosophy of "enlightened statism" was not universally subscribed to by Māori;166 
thus James Carroll, like many Māori, opposed the resumption of pre-emption.167 Compulsory 
purchase as per the LFSA did not feature in Māori land legislation. Nevertheless sales were often, to 
put it mildly, extremely reluctant. Māori Members of the House repeatedly invoked the parable of 
King Ahab, whose Queen Jezebel nefariously orchestrated the death of Naboth after he had refused 
to sell his vineyard to Ahab,168 a strategy the Māori Members shared somewhat incongruously with 
Legislative Councillor Pharazyn.169  
Aside from what Brooking calls the "simple [reasons] … of greed, racism and political 
expediency", underlying these and many other discriminatory legislative provisions was the principle 
of utility.170 The best claims to land were those of farmers who used the land efficiently. Māori land 
was often criticised as a wasted, unproductive wilderness and Liberal policy sought to change this for 
the benefit of productive settlers. As he was introducing the Native Land Purchase and Acquisition 
Act 1893, McKenzie warned:171 
The time has come, when the Natives must be called upon to make up their minds as to whether they 
would make good use of their land, or allow use to be made of it by the government. 
And yet, the Advances for Settlers scheme, which afforded low-cost loans to those who took up and 
improved land, excluded Māori almost entirely.172 
This significant disparity evokes a question: did the Liberals exploit the LFSA as convenient veil 
for their real target? Perhaps not. Certainly differing approaches were taken in the South and North 
Islands, designed to address specific problems. Māori landlordism, land underutilisation and 
"communistic" ownership were considered as evil as the land banking of South Island gentry. Liberal 
  
165  Brooking, above n 10, at 153.  
166  Boast, above n 11, at 192. 
167  Commission on Native Land Laws "Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Subject of the 
Native Land Laws" [1891] II AJHR G1 at xxviii. See also Boast, above n 11, at 186–195.  
168  See for example (5 September 1893) 81 NZPD 521 per Eparaima Te Mutu Kapa MHR. See also Brooking, 
above n 11, at 90.  
169  (28 August 1894) 85 NZPD 212–220. 
170  Brooking, above n 10, at 144. For examples of other provisions see Brooking, above n 11. 
171  (5 September 1893) 81 NZPD 512–513. 
172  Government Advances for Settlers Act 1894. See also Brooking, above n 10, at 141; and Boast, above n 11, 
at 260. 
146 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
policy relating to Māori land was conceived in terms "consistent with their aims of promoting closer 
settlement, revitalising rural communities, filling empty spaces with people and sharing property, 
wealth and power more evenly".173 
Propositions that McKenzie's motivations were more honourable than those of previous 
politicians are supported by few Liberals benefitting personally from the new wash of Māori land.174 
Indeed, they legislated to prevent "swindling" by one Legislative Councillor.175 Despite this, the 
Liberals simply cannot escape the fact that during McKenzie's time as Minister, a devastating amount 
of land was extracted from Māori. Brooking notes the double irony in Liberal treatment of Māori 
land:176 
First, in attempting to ensure that the horrors of the highland clearances were not repeated in New Zealand 
John McKenzie effectively dispossessed Maori. Second … Liberal purchase of so much Maori land for 
so little money widened the fracture in the New Zealand dream, a fracture which has yet to be healed. 
Pākehā owners of the great estates were treated as they were to ensure they were not alienated 
from political systems of the wider community. Compulsion, for instance, was used sparingly.177 In 
contrast, the Māori population had diminished, a trend believed to be irreversible.178 Consequently, 
Māori were progressively excluded. Liberal land policy regarding the greatest estate represents a 
paradox: many Māori were left in much the same position as those 90 people McKenzie had seen 
during the Highland Clearances. The deep tragedy remains that in focusing on perceptions of the Old 
World and "imposing their own modest dreams upon another people the Liberals lost an opportunity 
for the development of a truly bicultural society",179 and indeed, one that was genuinely uniformly 
fair.  
V AN IDEOLOGY IN CONCLUSION 
When pride cometh, then cometh shame: but with the lowly is wisdom.180 
With the aim of making good on Arcadian visions of New Zealand, the Liberals responded to the 
land question with more than mere rhetoric. Ballance and McKenzie, both in their own ways absorbed 
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by Old World land problems, inaugurated complex legislation in order to both softly encourage and 
bluntly force the breaking up of large estates for the benefit of a greater number of settlers.  
These policies looked radical, but were in fact used rather sensitively. They were tempered by the 
practicalities of farming and a desire to be fair to both sides of the equation. The estates themselves 
were more often than not selected with care and thus varied significantly in size, with the majority 
falling far below what one might call great. Compulsion, the most radical feature, was infrequently 
invoked.  
More equal wealth distribution was generally achieved. Great estates were reduced in number and 
in size; more people were on more plots of land. Yet whether the Liberal closer settlement policy is 
solely responsible for this remains questionable. Private subdivision accounts for at least as much as 
that settled under the LSFA. Moreover, the quantity of LFSA land is dwarfed by that taken and 
distributed under Māori land legislation. 
Liberal attitudes to Māori land is a lingering point of discordance. A combination of strict rules 
and compulsion was tempered with generosity and fairness when it came to Pākehā landowners and 
settlers, but not when it came to Māori. Addressing urban concerns directly, rather than as a trickle 
down benefactor of rural closer settlement, was also neglected. McKenzie may have "died confident 
that he had made it impossible for white settlers to experience any repeat of the Highland 
Clearances",181 but in the case of Māori land and urban issues, it appears he was fighting an Old 
World battle at the expense of important attributes of the New World context.  
Liberal politicians each had their failings and yet together they offered significant contributions 
to New Zealand's idea of itself. With varying degrees of conviction, they embarked on some of the 
most cherished legislative reform in New Zealand history: women's suffrage, the Queen's chain, union 
and arbitration legislation, old age pensions and penny postage to name a few. Land policy, too, had 
lasting effect. In their concern for reducing inequality of land ownership, the Liberals did not seek to 
eradicate the gentry altogether nor remove them from public life. As Brooking and Fairburn have 
noted, however, politics remained dominated by farmers and working men for the next generation.182 
Thus, despite finally losing their grip on power in 1912, the Liberals might lay claim to influencing 
the character of parliamentary representatives, and thus the character of the debate, for many years 
beyond.  
In the context of land, the colonial reality may not have met the Arcadian promise, but the Liberals 
developed a rhetoric that has retained significance in New Zealand politics and society ever since. 
The Liberals' triumphing of the concept of the family farm contributed to its continued strength, albeit 
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perhaps now existing primarily in the New Zealand mentality rather than reality. Likewise, while 
putting aside the particular arguments of freehold versus leasehold, the rhetoric of fairness, 
independence and stability would not appear out of place in the mouths of politicians today. Land, 
and access to it, remains a highly contested issue.  
What David Hackett Fischer calls New Zealand's "tradition of fairness … was not a simple story 
of continuity but a complex process of invention and rejection, achievement and failure … 
transformation and revival".183 Deep-seated pride in the settler dream carried with it inherent risks of 
overlooking essential particularities of context, leading to disparate outcomes. Yet closer settlement 
and its failings are part of a tradition that suggests, in the words of Brooking, that New Zealand was 
"a rather unusual place".184 As New Zealand continues to negotiate the effects of Liberal land policy 
and its ideologies, so too it remains. 
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